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Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002900160007-9

Executive Registry

63-32972

20 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Carter

Mr. McCone requests that the attached draft letter to
Mr. William C. Foster be studied by [redacted], Sherman
Kent, and Cline or Sheldon.

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After the Agency has agreed on a draft, it is to be
cleared with Mr. Gilpatrick who has written separately to State
that he agrees with the idea that CIA should be the single point
of liaison for ACDA on intelligence matters. A copy of Mr.
Gilpatrick's letter is attached.

STAT

[redacted]

W. Elder

Attachment

cc: Ex Dir

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19 April

The Honorable William C. Foster
Director, U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Bill:

In this letter I will attempt to summarise my understanding of the results of our discussion on April 17th, and in doing so, answer your letters to me of February 8th and April 8th, and Adrian Fisher's letter of February 18th. The topics and ideas covered by these letters has, as indicated by you, been the subject of several discussions between representatives of our respective organizations.

First, I would like to repeat that the intelligence community, and most particularly CIA and DIA (as they are most directly concerned with your problems), desire to afford the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency all possible cooperation. We appreciate that our intelligence findings and analysis have an important bearing on your activities.

We feel it is not practical to place a permanent representative on your staff as no one man has knowledge of all the phases of the intelligence community's activities and, therefore, would be able to properly serve your requirements. Likewise, it is not practical to set up a special unit in CIA to deal with ACDA's requirements as

your requirements reach into most of CIA's divisions and, therefore, such a unit would have to include at least one representative from a great number of our departments or divisions.

In addition, it is my belief and this has been concurred in by Secretary Gilpatrick, that there should be one focal point in the intelligence community as a liaison between the community and ACDA and that had probably best be set up in the Central Intelligence Agency. It would be unproductive, and probably involve the risk of you receiving differing reports, for ACDA to deal directly with the several units of the United States Intelligence Board and, hence, it is our opinion that one central liaison unit be charged with the responsibility for handling all ACDA's needs from the intelligence community.

With this in mind, I am ordering the creation of such a unit in CIA. The establishment of this unit will be approved by the United States Intelligence Board, will be adequately staffed, and will be authorized to call upon all members of the community as well as all divisions and departments of CIA to the extent necessary to meet your requirements. In this way, you will have a single source of intelligence information and the information you receive will represent the coordinated view of the community.

The liaison office will be charged with the responsibility of serving your needs promptly so that delays which you have experienced in the past can be avoided. I think this arrangement should meet your requirements.

The establishment of a USIB committee on ACDA matters as proposed in your letter presents difficulties because of your manifold needs. Your requirements do not present a parallel situation to JAEIC or GMAIC for they involve a very specific area of intelligence activity whereas your requirements range over a very broad field of intelligence reporting and analysis.

With respect to the ACDA representation on USIB committees such as JAEIC or GMAIC, or on USIB itself, it is my feeling that this would involve an extravagant waste of talent on your part for these committees are involved in a vast number of problems which are of no particular interest to ACDA. A better procedure is for ACDA to appear before the committees or the Board itself when matters of special interest to ACDA are up for consideration. This can be arranged by Mr. Hughes, Director of Intelligence and Research in the Department of State, who sits on USIB and has representatives on all of the committees and, therefore, can decide the circumstances under which ACDA representation should be called in. This, incidentally, is a procedure we follow in a great many departments of the Government who have a particular knowledge and special interest in a problem that may be brought before the Board or one of its committees.

With respect to the suggestions made in Mr. Fisher's letter that USIB make judgment on the range of probable error in estimates of Soviet capability, order of battle, quantity of military items, etc., I am at a loss to understand just what USIB could do along this line which would be constructive. What is asked by Mr. Fisher is that "...in addition to

commenting on the range of probable error, the intelligence community might also... indicate their degree of confidence that the estimates are not grossly in error.... ACDA will, in addition, require an estimate of range of error or total inventories as well."

USIB regularly produces estimates of Soviet capabilities, order of battle, military inventories, etc., and these are under constant review and are revised from time to time as new dependable intelligence develops. In many instances, members of the community differ in these evaluations and it is my practice to set out the dissenting views in footnotes to the estimates. Some estimates are based on very hard intelligence. Others are arrived at by a synthesis of all available intelligence, a great deal of which cannot be evaluated as being "hard." The information on which the final conclusions are based is carefully studied by the intelligence community and the estimates reflect the degree of certainty which we have in our conclusions. Certainly no estimates are produced which are "grossly in error" nor is it practical to develop what is referred to as an "estimate of the probable error". When there is doubt, the estimate contains a range. When new information indicates that the range is not correct, a revised estimate is produced. I frankly do not see how we can go further.

One point I must add is to emphasize the very great difficulty of developing the rate of production of military items, and in the case of some items, the total inventory. As an example, we feel we knew with reasonable assurances the MRBM, IRBM, and ICBM launchers in the

Soviet Union. Also, we know something of their military doctrine concerning the "reloading of the pads." However, we do not know the number of missiles in existence, nor the rate of production. The same is true of a great many other military items. Hence, it is not practical to proceed on any basis of destroying end items and then reaching a conclusion of what is left by the process of subtraction. What is necessary and appears to me indispensable if we are to pursue a safe course is an arrangement which would provide for the inspection of both the destroyed items and the remaining inventory.

With respect to the final question raised by Mr. Fisher which is the extent to which intelligence can contribute to the inspection provisions of a treaty, I feel that this is a matter which should be very intensively studied by your staff and appropriate representatives of the intelligence community. Intelligence can make a real contribution in this area. Advantage should be taken of the potentials of the intelligence community, not only with respect to gathering information but more particularly with regard to the intelligence processes used in arriving at a reasonable and dependable quantitative analysis.

In studying this we must always look to the permanence of intelligence sources. Many of them are subject to compromise, and once compromised, as is frequently the case through press leaks, they disappear at once. It seems to me that proven intelligence processes of analysis and estimates and the community's customary practice of drawing a reasonable conclusion from a synthesis of a wide spectrum of information is the most useful contribution the community can make to your problem.

I will be pleased to discuss this matter further with you
after you have considered the points in this letter.

John A. McCone
Director

JAM/bd

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